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Estimating the Position of the European Union:
A Tool for Macro-Quantitative Studies
Detlef Jahn and Nils Düpont
Abstract
This paper develops an index for estimating the position of the European Union in various policy fields and 
ideological dimensions. The index is designed for macro-comparative studies, which currently mainly use a 
dummy variable as a proxy for the impact of the EU on domestic politics, policies and outcomes. The index 
assesses the position of each European institution (European Council, Council of Ministers, Commission, 
and European Parliament) and takes the frequently changing decision-making rules between these insti-
tutions into account. Based on an actor-centered approach the index links policy preferences of actors 
with formal and informal decision-making rules. The index thereby appraises the impact of the EU on its 
member states in greater detail and is therefore suitable for analyses of most urgent research questions 
concerning the relationship between the EU and its member states. Furthermore, the index allows a cal-
culation of the positional and ideological misfits between the EU and each individual member state on 
an annual basis. Questions about an ideological bias of the EU or problems of compliance can thus be 
analyzed with greater precision than before. To illustrate our index we use data on the left-right dimension, 
which has proven to be highly relevant in macro-quantitative studies. The data is available for quarterly and 
annual longitudinal analyses from 1966 to 2012.
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1. Introduction1
There seems to be no doubt that the European Union (EU)2 is a major institutional actor whose impact on 
European domestic policies has increased substantially in recent decades. In some areas around 80 percent 
of all political decisions by member states have been initiated by the European Union (Börzel/Risse 2000; 
Hix 2005: 3). However, there is less agreement on which position the EU takes in relation to its member 
states (Selck/Kaeding 2004; Selck/Kuipers 2005; Schneider et al. 2010; Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson 
2011; Golub 2012). Some conclude that the final outcome of aggregated individual decisions does not favor 
any state or government, thus legitimating the European integration process (Héritier 1999; Bailer 2004: 
113; Arregui/Thomson 2009: 671). This position emerges from strong normative claims arguing that the 
EU is the (future) political entity with which all member states should feel comfortable. It can also refer to 
decision-making rules such as the right to veto and unanimous rule, which protect the interests of small or 
weak states, and thus promotes the EU position as a compromise between all member states. In sharp con-
trast, others claim that large states have more influence in the EU and are able to move the final outcome 
closer to their own position. This realist view (Moravcsik 1991, 1998) also emerges from strong normative 
and procedural reasoning, whereby countries with a large population and a strong economy have more 
weight in the decision-making process than small states. Decision-making rules which grant larger states 
more formal voting power, as well as de facto economic and administrative advantages, support this theory 
(Hix/Høyland 2011: 16; Thomson 2011: 188).
When leaving aside the normative implications and examining only formal decision-making rules, there 
is support for both standpoints. Because the decision-making process in the EU has evolved over time, it 
is often perceived to have contradictory effects. The EU decision-making process thus partly represents a 
consensus model while also favoring the interests of larger states. Thus, as we argue in this paper, the de-
cision-making process does not follow one principle but instead is a blend of both. Its results are therefore 
highly unpredictable and also give considerable discretion to the bargaining skills of political actors.
However, to settle this issue will not be the main focus of this paper. Instead we offer a more sophisticated 
measure on how to estimate ‘the position of the EU’ on domestic politics, policy and outcomes. In most 
macro-quantitative studies the impact of the EU is operationalized as a dummy variable where ‘0’ is no EU 
membership and ‘1’ is EU membership. This is a very crude measure but one which has been incorporated 
into many studies analyzing policies such as active labor market policies (Armingeon 2007; Swank 2011), 
social expenditure (Kittel/Obinger 2003), environmental policies (Knill et al. 2010), privatization (Obinger 
et al. 2014), or taxation (Hays 2003). Using a dummy variable to estimate the impact of the EU on domestic 
policies and outcomes is inappropriate for the following reasons: Firstly, a dummy variable is simply a proxy 
1 Detlef Jahn would like to thank Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse for the invitation to act as a Permanent Research 
Fellow at the KFG from 2012-2017. We received helpful comments at the weekly seminar series on a first draft of 
this paper. We particularly benefited from the comments of Lisbeth Hooghe, Gary Marks, Heike Klüver and two 
anonymous reviewers. Christian Jensen (UNLV) also commented on a previous version of this paper. We are grate-
ful for his insightful remarks, which make us aware of the limits of our approach. We also would like to thank our 
colleagues at Greifswald University for discussing the conceptualization of the decision-making models. The data 
and do-files for creating the indices discussed in this paper can be downloaded from: http://comparativepolitics.
uni-greifswald.de.
2 We use EU throughout the text, even when referring to the time when it was called European Community.
                         Estimating the Position of the European Union  | 7
for a more complex variable. For some variables, such as gender, a dummy may be appropriate. However, 
for most other variables with finer degrees/gradients of variation the loss of information is substantial and 
the validity of the operationalization to capture the theoretical concept decreases. Using a dummy for EU 
membership also bears the risk of measuring an entirely different factor, which simply happens to coincide 
with EU membership. Secondly, it does not take account of any dynamic processes as the impact of the 
EU is perceived as invariant over time (with the exception of the change from being a non-member to a 
member state). Thirdly, a dummy attributes the same effect of the EU on all national governments and pol-
icies. This assumption may not be very realistic as the position of the EU changes over time and the impact 
of the EU on a member state is dependent on the positions of the individual governments of the member 
states. This difference, which we call the ideological misfit between the EU and its member states, can be 
estimated with the help of the index developed in this paper (Jahn/Düpont 2015). The index presented 
here thus allows for the analysis of the transformative power of the EU on its member states and beyond.
In order to calculate the position of the EU we trace the decision-making process within and between EU 
institutions from 1966 to 2012. The starting year 1966 has been chosen for the Luxembourg Compromise, 
which was introduced in that year and presented “the first major informal norm in EU decision-making 
procedures” (Heisenberg 2005: 68), shaping decision-making in the EU for years to come. The last year 
with available data is 2012. We apply a left-right measure (Jahn 2011) based on data from the Manifesto 
Research on Political Representation (MARPOR; Volkens et al. 2013); henceforth any issue dimension de-
rived from MARPOR or other cross-national sources which locate parties (like expert judgements or sur-
veys) can be applied to our modeling.3 Commonly, the political space of the European Union is perceived 
to encompass a pro-integrationist vs. an anti-integrationist and a left-right dimension (for an overview of 
different views see Marks/Steenbergen 2002). For illustrative purposes however, we limit ourselves to the 
left-right dimension; it is the dominant policy dimension in Western democracies and explains policies and 
policy outcomes in most policy areas on domestic policies (McDonald/Budge 2005).
In this paper, we primarily describe the construction of our index and present only a few examples on how 
to analytically apply it. Consequently, our aim is to offer a tool for further empirical analysis in the field. 
The paper is structured in the following way: Firstly, we briefly discuss established approaches of identify-
ing ‘the EU position’. After examining the benefits and shortcomings of these approaches, we outline an 
alternative actor-centered approach and present and discuss the premises and assumptions of our model. 
The third part of the paper describes how policy positions are attributed to European actors. As the main 
part of this paper it offers models through which to analyze the positions of the European Council, the 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). Subsequently, we take 
the intra-institutional decision-making into account in order to identify the final position of the EU in the 
left-right dimension from 1966 to 2012. Besides offering analytical models through which to grasp the 
decision-making process in the EU, we report on empirical positions. Finally, the conclusion summarizes 
the results.4
3 However, it is important that there are data available for most of the relevant parties in all EU member states. If 
there are a certain amount of missing data the index is biased.
4 The data presented here are available for download at: http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de.
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2. Approaches for Estimating an EU Position
The following part discusses current approaches for estimating EU positions. Based on their shortcomings 
we then outline the basic premises of our approach. The literature approaches the question of how to esti-
mate the position of the EU in a variety of ways (Bueno de Mesquita 1994; König 2007, 2008; Moser 2002; 
Steunenberg et al. 1999; Tsebelis/Garrett 2000, 2001; van den Bos 1991).5 In recent years, two approaches 
have been particularly successful. Most popular is the use of the European Union Decides (DEU) data set 
which contains data on 331 policy issues from 1996 to 2008 (Thomson et al. 2012). Authors who use this 
data set compare the power of a handful of member states (Selck/Kaeding 2004; Selck/Kuipers 2005) or 
analyze the period from 1999-2001 (Golub 2012). The data set is based on expert judgments on the policy 
positions of various political actors. Likewise, some EU institutions are analyzed individually at a certain 
point in time, like the EP (McElroy/Benoit 2007, 2010)6, the Commission (Thomson 2008a) or the European 
Council (Tallberg/Johansson 2008).
Other authors make use of party manifesto data and thus have a longer time period available to them 
(König 2007; Warntjen et al. 2008; Veen 2011). However, these studies often estimate the position of the 
European institutions without taking decision-making rules into account. Warntjen et al. (2008) use the 
mean position of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EP based on the parties in government 
in the respective EU member states. Using the mean builds on the argument of Achen (2006a) who shows 
that the weighted mean is an effective measure when combining formal and informal decision-making pro-
cesses. However, Achen also stresses the fact that if more information is available, more precise measures 
can be obtained. 
Achen (2006a) and Schneider et al. (2010) compare the explanatory power of several models and conclude 
that it is not always the case that the most sophisticated formal model arrives at the best results. In fact, 
looking at formal processes only is certainly inferior to combining formal and informal aspects. In this paper 
we therefore build on the formal decision-making process but also integrate informal aspects. The indices 
in this paper cover data from 1966 to 2012 and are therefore superior to the data of the DEU project, which 
cover a much shorter period. In contrast to the projects based on the party manifesto data, which do not 
consider the legislative process of the EU, the indices developed here do take these into account.
This paper then builds on two premises: The first premise is that institutional settings and prefer-
ences matter. This is the basic assumption of analytical politics or the fundamental equation of politics, 
5 In a book edited by Thomson et al. (2006) several models have been introduced. Achen (2006a) evaluates these 
models by analyzing their power of explanation. Models which do not focus exclusively on formal decision-making 
structures but also include informal negotiations seem to perform better. This conclusion, however, is disputed 
(Slapin 2014; Leinaweaver/Thomson 2014).
6 Furthermore – but limited to the EP – issue dimensions have been analyzed based on roll-call votes (see for exam-
ple Attina 1990; Hix 2001; Hix et al. 2005). But even Warntjen and colleagues, who have conducted such roll call 
analysis, have concluded that this method is not appropriate to compare the position of European institutions, be-
cause there are no data, for instance, for the European Commission (Warntjen et al. 2008: 1245). There exists also 
an analysis of party manifestos released for the European elections (Schmitt/Wüst 2012), which Veen (2011) uses 
for his models. However, as discussed in the text below, it is doubtful whether MPs of the European Parliament 
follow the European policy logic or a national one.
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which has been summarized by Plott (1991; see also Hinich/Munger 1997: 17; Shepsle 1989: 137) as: 
Preferences * Institutions  Political Outcome. As has been noted, these two elements are essential for 
empirical research because “[…] agenda setting power depends not only on the institutional features of a 
political system […] but also on the ideological positions […] of different actors” (Tsebelis/Rasch 2011: 2). 
As a consequence, our models are ideology-driven and we refrain from purely formal bargaining models 
that are based solely on voting strength. The second premise is that each EU institution, which takes part in 
the legislative process, first comes to a decision on which position to take on a particular issue. In a second 
step, inter-institutional decision-making in accordance with various rules and procedures leads to the final 
EU position.
In order to estimate the position of the EU in the left-right dimension on a yearly7 basis from 1966 to 
2012, we use an actor-centered approach. An actor-centered approach traces its starting point from the 
individual actor (Prime Ministers and Presidents, Commissioners, Ministers, and Members of European 
Parliament). These actors must reach collective decisions, which are determined by formal decision-mak-
ing rules and informal bargaining and negotiation processes. While formal rules may be relatively easily 
identified, they have changed frequently over the course of EU history. Their empirical analysis is thus 
a little complex, though this does not cause major problems. The identification of informal processes is 
more difficult, though. We therefore use the results of other empirical studies, which estimate the effect 
of informal processes. Such information must take general aspects into account and cannot only be based 
on the results of very specific case studies. We thus rely on expert judgments about the relative informal 
power of various European institutions (Thomson/Hosli 2006). Because including informal aspects may be 
partly speculative, we conduct detailed robustness checks and show the differences between our model 
and alternative specifications in the appendix.
Formal models as well as bargaining models usually only include the three EU institutions which take part 
in the legislative process of the EU. This is certainly the case with those models that examine the formal leg-
islative process. The European Council, comprising the Head of States, is ignored by these studies because 
it is not part of this legislative process. Yet, the European Council is an important actor in EU politics as it 
“[…] sets the guidelines and objectives for the Commission and monitors how the Commission implements 
these guidelines” (Hix/Høyland 2011: 32). Furthermore, “[…] the European Council provides guidance for 
the work of the meetings of the Council (of ministers) […]” (Hix/Høyland 2011: 32). The impact of the 
European Council is on “[…] political rather than legal decisions […]” (Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997) which 
may justify disregarding the European Council in formal decision models. However, for the estimation 
of programmatic positions in the Commission and the Council of Ministers, the impact of the European 
Council cannot be ignored. Therefore, we treat the European Council as principal and the Commission and 
the Council of Ministers as agents.
Before beginning the analysis of the institutions of the EU, we will clarify how to estimate positions within 
the EU institutions. What are the preferences of the members of the European Council, the Commission, the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP) in relevant policy dimensions? First of all, it must be 
7 The estimates are actually based on quarterly data but can be easily aggregated on a yearly basis in order to match 
common quantitative time-series–cross-sectional data.
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noted that there are no direct measures of the ideological positions of European actors and institutions. One 
way to approach these positions is by using data from national parties. Warntjen et al. (2008: 1247) conclude 
that “[…] the assumption can be made that the actors of the EU institutions have broadly similar policy prefer-
ences to the political parties to which they belong.”8 For illustrative purposes we estimate the positions of the 
European actors in the left-right dimension. We identify the scores for the dimension by using MARPOR data 
applying a country- and time-sensitive left-right index developed by Jahn (2011). Our analysis can be applied 
to any issue dimension derived from MARPOR data or other party positions, such as expert judgements, and 
should thus not be a big issue of dispute concerning our analysis here. We decided to illustrate our index in 
terms of a left-right dimension because this factor is most relevant for explaining the policies and outcomes 
in most macro-comparative studies. However, there is no fundamental obstruction to using other positions, 
such as for instance the degree of European integration, which is most common in the EU-literature.
Using national party positions makes the most sense in the context of the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers, both of which are composed of national political actors: the prime ministers and the cabinet 
ministers of national governments. Meanwhile, there is also evidence that the members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) – trapped between two principles – abide more to the rules of their national parties 
than the logic of their respective European party groups (Hix 2002, 2004). Within these party groups, na-
tional delegations are powerful and dominate key leadership positions. “Also, because national parties con-
trol the selection of candidates in the elections, when MEPs are torn between their national party and their 
European political group, they almost always vote with their national party” (Hix/Høyland 2011: 57). In the 
case of the EP Euromanifestos issued in the run-up to EP elections provide an alternative measure of party 
positions to national MARPOR data (Schmitt/Wüst 2012). Yet, we abstained from using Euromanifesto data 
for the EP for three reasons: First of all, elections to the EP are usually considered “second-order national 
elections” (Reif/Schmitt 1980) fought on national grounds (see Hix et al. 2003 for a more recent reinforce-
ment). Furthermore, it is questionable if voters pay much attention at all, as evidence suggests that EP 
elections are, not exclusively, but primarily used to “punish” governments for national reasons (Schmitt 
2005; Hix/Marsh 2007; Hobolt et al. 2009), whereby voting behavior is strongly shaped by party identifi-
cation and a “rational ignorance” of EU politics (Schmitt 2005). The second reason is more technical: The 
Euromanifestos’ coding scheme is similar but not identical to the national MARPOR data. This would alter 
the comparability of the position of the EP (based on Euromanifestos) vis-à-vis the European Council or 
Council of Ministers (based on national MARPOR data). And finally, for a small number of parties (especially 
in the early years) we do have MARPOR data but Euromanifestos are missing or were not issued.
More problematic than the use of national data for the EP is the use of national party positions for the 
Commission. According to Article 213 of the EU Treaty, commissioners are non-partisan actors. In practice, 
however, commissioners lean towards the position of their national party or government (Thomson 2008a). 
There are several reasons for this, such as the fact that the member states’ governments are responsible for 
the nominations of “their” commissioners. Commissioners are most often affiliated with the national party 
of the government, which promoted his or her appointment. More than 70 percent of the Commissioners 
8 Warntjen et al. (2008) conduct a rather similar analysis as the one in this study in order to identify the positions 
of the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the EP. However, they limit their analysis to a description of the 
policy position of these three institutions. They do not analyze the legislative process between these institutions 
which would be needed, for example, to estimate the position of the EU in relation to its member states.
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between 1967 and 2009 held a government office before becoming a Commissioner (Hix 2005: 46). This 
figure has increased steadily over the years, reaching more than 90 percent in the 1990s (Franchino 2007: 
136-137; MacMullen 1997; Wonka 2007). Hooghe (2001) also shows that Commissioners’ preferences are 
mainly shaped by their political party, country and prior work rather than being a result of socialization in 
the Commission. Furthermore, after their term as Commissioner, the national party usually provides a new 
position for the outgoing Commissioners. In other words, Commissioners are dependent upon, and thus 
likely in (ideological) alignment with their respective national parties. Therefore, we may confidently use 
the ideological position of the national parties when estimating the position of the Commissioners.
3. Policy Positions of EU Institutions
The European Union has a complex decision-making process that involves various institutions. The day-
to-day political process is determined by the intra- and inter-decision-making processes of the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. How exactly the European political pro-
cess works is highly debated and contested in political science (Bueno de Mesquita/Stokman 1994; Kasack 
2004; Hörl et al. 2005; Selck/Steunenberg 2004; Thomson/Hosli 2006; Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson 
2008b). Among the reasons for this disagreement lies the fact that decision-making rules have often been 
modified and different rules apply for different policy areas. There are also disagreements regarding how 
to interpret the impact of all the formal and informal rules of the policy process in the EU. In this paper, 
we offer a simplified and parsimonious model of EU politics for macro-comparative analyses. We start out 
from formal models of negotiation and decision-making. However, as mentioned above, we consider the 
European Council (heads of governments) as the principal for the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
We therefore begin our analysis with the European Council.
3.1 The European Council
The European Council is composed of the heads of government of the member states and the president of 
the European Commission, and it meets two to four times per year. The prime ministers of each member 
country and the presidents of France and Cyprus are the members of the European Council. The deci-
sion-making rule is unanimity and every member is able to veto a decision. This decision procedure is sup-
posed to produce “lowest common denominator” results. In practice however, the European Council has 
often been an initiator for policy change and has promoted the process of European integration. Therefore, 
the European Council has been able to set innovative policy goals which have reached clearly beyond the 
level of the ‘lowest common denominator’.
The presidency of the European Council changes every six months and the country with the presidency 
has a considerable influence on setting the agenda for the meetings. Since 1 January, 2010 the President 
of the European Union has been responsible for agenda setting, together with the respective national 
government. From this date, member states have been chairing the following three meetings together 
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with the President of the European Union, in order to reinforce continuity. However, there is very little 
research on who influences the decisions of the European Council, as most studies remain either descrip-
tive or give insightful and up-to-date overviews of the European Council (Bulmer/Wessels 1987; Johnston 
1994; Westlake et al. 2004; Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997). In a more analytical study, Tallberg (2008) has 
addressed the question of bargaining power in the European Council. In this qualitative study based on 
expert interviews with former prime ministers and heads of state, as well as high ranking European officials, 
he concludes that member states have various degrees of bargaining power and that the threat of a veto 
is not equally effective for all member states. This finding suggests that there is not a trend towards the 
‘lowest common denominator’ but that bargaining depends on the power resources of individual states.
Member states differ most fundamentally in terms of their structural power, that is, the size of a country 
(population) and its economic power, in all but one case. Tallberg (2008: 690) concludes that only Italy has 
been unable to translate its relative power in population and economic strength into European influence 
because of its domestic political instability. While structural power may depend on a number of features 
such as territory, population, economic strength, military capability, technological development, politi-
cal stability, administrative capacity and geography, its two most important indicators are the number of 
inhabitants of a state and its economic productivity. We therefore use population (StrucPow
1
) and the 
economic performance (StrucPow
2
) as indicators for structural power.
    (1)
     (2)
Explanations: StrucPow means Structural Power. The share in population and GDP per capita is estimated 
as the share in the total EU member’s population and GDP for each year. PMi stands for the policy position 
of the prime minister in country i.
Tallberg (2008) concludes that institutional and individual dimensions of power are of secondary impor-
tance. Institutional power is composed of decision-making rules. Two aspects seem to be particularly rel-
evant in the context of bargaining power: the veto and the presidency. Each member of the European 
Council can veto a decision, which means that the veto forces decisions to be taken unanimously. Studies of 
international bargaining assume that veto provisions strengthen the position of actors with less structural 
power and actors which prefer the status quo (Habeeb 1988; Hampson 1995: 32; Scharpf 1997). However, 
the veto in the European Council is not as sharp a weapon as is assumed. Its use is tightly connected to 
the structural power of the member states. As one prime minister has stated: “Luxemburg can issue a veto 
once in a decade and Britain once a week” (cited in Tallberg 2008: 691). The veto has further implications 
which undermine its formal strength. The foreknowledge of potential veto affects the members of the 
European Council and its use may irritate peers thus affecting other issues of negotiation. Furthermore, a 
veto never puts an end to a political process but rather forces it to be settled in another way. The use of a 
veto is a sign of negotiation failure as well as strategic weakness rather than strength. Put simply, the veto 
is less decisive in the European Council as is often assumed in formal modeling. 
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Instead of the veto, the power, which comes with chairing the European presidency, seems to be more 
effective. Good preparation of a meeting may temporarily increase the power of the chairing country. As 
Tallberg (2008: 697) points out: “It is notable that representatives of small and medium-sized states tend 
to rank access to the Presidency as the most important source of power […]”. The power of the presidency 
is derived from actual meetings in which the presidency has the right to set the agenda and by doing so 
decides what will be debated in which order, thus arranging what is emphasized and what is neglected. 
Power of the chair may actually be greatest in the preparatory phase during which the chairing country has 
the opportunity to build coalitions on the issues and positions that are important to it:
The Presidency either travels to or receives all other heads of government in the weeks preceding the 
summit. The format of the bilateral encounter enables heads of government to share information about 
their bottom lines with the Presidency, thus improving the chances of summit agreements on conten-
tious issues (Tallberg 2008: 698).
We operationalize institutional power in the European Council as originating from the position of the 
Presidency on programmatic dimensions. The President of the European Council negotiates with each 
prime minister or head of state. For each negotiation, the unweighted mean between the President of the 
European Council and the prime ministers is summed up to a position. This position reflects the institu-
tional power of the Presidency (InstPow).
      (3)
Explanations: InstPow designates Institutional Power; PMi is the policy position of the prime minister of 
country i; the number varies according to the number of member states.
Finally, Tallberg identifies individual power in the European Council. The most important aspect here is 
seniority and prior performance. The longer a prime minster has been a member of the European Council, 
the better s/he knows the institutional rules, the preferences of peers and the issues at stake. This forms 
an important power resource. As one head of government in Tallberg’s study (2008: 700) puts it: “Juncker 
probably weighs more than countries with 12 to 14 million inhabitants”.9 Expertise is also an important 
resource. Expertise concerns the content, the process and knowledge of preferences of the other members 
in the European Council. Most of these concepts are difficult to measure for quantitative analysis with the 
exception of seniority. Seniority may also be highly correlated with expertise and earlier performance even 
if some personalities could reinforce or reduce this association. The indicator for individual power (IndPow) 
is the number of quarters of a year served as prime minister before the meeting of the European Council.10
     (4)
9 Before his election as President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker was prime minister of Luxembourg which 
has around half a million inhabitants.
10 Because the data is organized in annual quarters, we apply the same fine-grained time unit.
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Even if the calculation of the position of the European Council is not free from ambiguity, it may come close 
to reality considering the information that is available.11 Formally, the position of the European Council 
(ECouPO) is defined as follows:
   (5)
The European Council has no formal power in the legislative process of the EU. Only in December 2009 did the 
European Council become a formal European institution. However, because the European Council defines the 
general political direction and priorities of the European Union, as well as providing the Union with the nec-
essary impetus for its development (European Union 2015), there is a typical principal-agent relationship be-
tween the European Council as a principal on the one hand, and the Commission and the Council of Ministers 
as agents on the other (Hix/Høyland 2011: 23-34).12 As is typical in principal-agent analysis, it is notoriously 
difficult to specify the discretion of the agent and the power of control and sanctions of the principal. As 
Achen (2006b) points out in the context of bargaining situation when there is no further reliable information, 
the best guess for constructing a decision-making model is to use the mean position between two or more 
actors weighted by their power. We therefore simply take the unweighted mean position for the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers, on the one hand, with the position of the European Council, on the other. For 
that, however, we need to define the institutional decision-making rules of the Commission and the Council 
of Ministers. But before coming back to this point we present empirical data for the positions in the Council.
11 One may criticize that our models do not consider bargaining strategies like informal vote trading (‘log rolling’), 
inter-temporal vote swapping, first-mover advantages or (dis-) advantages stemming from national constraints 
(‘Schelling conjecture’). Although we do draw on game theoretical models, we still employ a macro-comparative 
perspective whose aim is not to make predictions for specific bargaining situations on a micro-level. To our knowl-
edge no comparable, longitudinal data is available for any of the institutions with respect to these strategies. As 
Achen (2006b) stresses, in the absence of detailed information, using the weighted mean incorporates aspects of 
bargaining strategies. In this sense our models do include strategies as we consider institutional and individual 
dimensions of power together with legal formalities. In principle, the impact of national constraints could be in-
cluded in our model in the future by integrating our time-variant veto player index (Jahn 2010). This would require 
an elaborated analysis, as Tarar (2001) reminds us that the “Schelling conjecture” does not hold in every circum-
stance but heavily depends on the configuration of constraints (and mutual knowledge thereof) on both sides of 
the bargaining partnership. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, and we leave the issue for future 
research.
12 Other authors model the principal-agent relationships in the EU differently. Hix and Høyland (2011: 25-27) start out 
from national governments as principals and the Commission as agent. Franchino (2007) considers the Commission 
and national bureaucracies as agents and EU legislators as principals. All these models have proven their use in 
specific situations. However, taking the preferences of national governments as principals is far removed from the 
political process of the EU. It would imply that there are 27 principals with their individual (collective) preferences. 
Taking governments’ positions a step further means that governments aggregate their priority preference and 
articulate it within the European Council. This preference or position is then one of the principals. It is needless 
to say that in this case the principal as a collective actor is not coherent, and neither are national governments. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider the negotiated position of the governments in the European Council 
as the preference of the principal. While conceptualizing the Council of Ministers as the agent might seem odd, 
since the ministers are part of the national government, two considerations may lend support to the view that the 
Council of Ministers is in fact an agent: Firstly, ministers may not represent the position of their government. In 
particular, the minister model (Laver/Shepsle 1996) attributes ministers power over their jurisdiction in a coalition 
government, thus the position of a minister may deviate from ‘the government position’. Secondly, since we do 
not take the position of national governments to be the position of the principal but the negotiated position of the 
prime ministers, the European Council’s position may deviate considerably from the position of the ministers in the 
Council.
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In order to get an insight into the positions held within the European Council, we report the positions of the 
prime minister or president who holds the presidency, the final position of the European Council according 
to the bargaining rules spelled out above and the two extreme positions (Figure 1).13








1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Position of European Council Position of presidency
Maximum position Minimum position
Source: Authors.
In the 45 years covered by our data, we see a trend towards left positions in the first half of the 1970s. This 
move to the Left occurred under the presidencies of Edmund Leburton in 1973, who was Belgian Prime 
Minister and member of the Socialist Party, as well as Willy Brandt (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 
in 1974. In the second half of 1976, Joop den Uyl from the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA) represented the most 
left-leaning presidency to date. This move was counterbalanced by a clear trend towards right-wing po-
sitions in the late 1970s. In the second half of the 1980s, the presidency of the United Kingdom, but also 
Belgium and Denmark, led to the European Council’s far right position. In the second half of 1986, under 
the presidency of Margret Thatcher the European Council took the most right-wing position in its history. 
However, Mrs. Thatcher was superseded in 2002 by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Danish prime minister and 
leader of the conservative-liberal party Venstre (V). After the right-wing turn of the mid-1980s, a slight 
counter-move to the left took place under the presidencies of Greece, Spain and France – all of which had 
13 Appendix A gives a more thorough account of our modelling by reporting alternative modellings and descriptive 
statistics for the structural and individual power indicators.
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Social Democratic prime ministers at the time. Yet, right-wing positions clearly dominated in the 1990s and 
a move to the Left was only noticeable towards the end of the decade under Austrian Prime Minister Viktor 
Klima (SPÖ) and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD). In the new millennium, right-wing positions 
remained dominant, even if there were substantial shifts depending on which country held the presidency. 
In summation, there has been a clear trend towards increased domination by the Right.
3.2 The Commission
The European Commission is the formal agenda-setter in European politics, due to its monopoly on initi-
ating legislation and its right to raise charges against member states before the European Court of Justice. 
The Commission is organized much like a domestic government with a core executive branch, in this case 
the College of Commissioners. The President of the Commission is the first among equals. However, s/
he sets the overall policy agenda of the Commission by preparing the annual work program, establishing 
the agenda and chairing the meetings of the College, and s/he is furthermore in charge of the Secretariat 
General, which oversees the work of the Directorates General. When votes are taken, decisions require an 
absolute majority, with the Commission’s President casting the deciding vote in the event of a tie. 
The position of the Commission operates along the lines of coalition cabinets in national governments. 
“The Commission has always been a grand coalition of socialists, Christian democrats, liberals and con-
servatives (MacMullen 1997). However, its political agenda changes as the political color of the president 
and the partisan make-up of the College changes” (Hix 2005: 44). In order to estimate the position of the 
Commission, we use a model that takes the agenda-setting power of the President and the ideological 
position of the Commissioner holding the economic portfolio into account.14 The model starts out from the 
negotiated position of the President of the Commission (PresCom) and the Commissioner with the eco-
nomic portfolio (ComPortfolio). Both positions have not been weighted nor has the personality of specific 
commissioners been taken into account. While the President is able to set the agenda, the Commissioners 
have expertise over their portfolio (Ross 1995: 162, 197; Sbragia 1996: 244-246) and it is therefore theoret-
ically impossible to determine who has more power.
The negotiated position between the President and the Commissioners with the specific portfolios (the 
mean between these positions) is taken as a starting point to find a minimal winning coalition within 
the Commission. This means that the unweighted position of the Commissioner coming closest to the 
compromise of the President and specific Commissioner is taken into account (Com
closest1
), then the second 
closest (Com
closest2
) and so on, until an absolute majority is achieved. The average of the positions of the 
Commissioners needed to form a majority is taken as the position of the Commission.
14 We use the economic portfolio and later on the Council of Economic Ministers because economic decisions are 
often most likely to be affected by the left-right dimension. For more specific analyses other portfolios and Councils 
of Ministers may be more relevant. See Jahn (2016) for analyses of environmental policies based on the environ-
mental portfolio and Council of Environmental Ministers. In said study Jahn also includes the environmental policy 
dimension in addition to the left-right placement.
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 (6)
Explanations: ComPo = position of the Commission; PresCom = policy position of the President of the 
Commission; Com
portfolio
 = policy position of the Commissioner with the respective portfolio.
Because the Commission is the agent of the European Council the final position of the Commission is the 
mean:
       (7)
Figure 2 shows the position of the Commission in the left-right policy dimension.15 While the Commission 
has been rather moderate, it has usually leaned to the right. Under the presidency of German Walter 
Hallstein (CDU), the Commission began as quite moderate before shifting to the moderate Left in the 
late 1960s under Belgian Liberal Jean Rey and Italian Christian Democrat Franco Malfatti. Sicco Leendert 
Mansholt from the Dutch PvDA (1972) and Roy Jenkins from the British Labour Party (1977-1981) marked 
strong leftist presidencies. They were interrupted by French Gaullist François-Xavier Ortoli (1973-1976), 
later responsible for economic affairs (1977-1981) where he stood in opposition to Jenkins. However, nei-
ther Jenkins’ nor Mansholt’s presidency was able to counteract the shift to the right that had begun in the 
late 1970s.
15 As with the European Council, we estimated several alternative positions to the final one presented here. These 
models are discussed in Appendix B.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Position of European Commission Position of commissioner (economic affairs)
Position of presidency
Maximum position Minimum position
Source: Authors.
The allocation of economic responsibilities was often shared among several commissioners. Most often 
they were concerned with issues of the internal market, competition or industrial affairs among others. The 
position of ‘the’ commissioner(s) therefore often reflects the unweighted mean of these commissioners. 
1977-1981 witnessed the Belgian Ètienne Davignon (non-aligned), French François-Xavier Ortoli (Gaullists) 
and Luxembourgian Raymond Vaul (LSAP) in opposition to the Left-leaning president Roy Jenkins (Labour). 
With the presidency of Gaston Thorn, the shift to the Right continued and was slightly reversed under the 
presidency of previous Minister of Finance, the French Socialist Jacques Delors. Together with the German 
Alois Pfeiffer (SPD), both had to deal with more conservative Irishman Peter Sutherland (FG), the Spanish 
Abel Matutes (PP) and the British Francis Arthur Cockfield (Conservatives) (1985-1989). Changes in the 
cabinet did not fundamentally alter the situation as Delors was later confronted with the Danish Henning 
Cristophersen (V) and the German Martin Bangemann (FDP), both with a liberal background (1989-1993). 
While the commission became less Right leaning in the 2000s under Romano Prodi and José Manuel 
Barroso, it still advocated more Right-wing than Left-wing positions. Not surprisingly, commissioners deal-
ing with economic affairs most often came from liberal or conservative parties, while social democratic 
parties remained underrepresented in this area.
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3.3 The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is composed of ministers from the governments of the member states and 
possesses both executive and legislative powers. The Council is the body which represents the member 
states in the political system of the EU. Since 1970, the presidency of the Council rotates every six months 
among the member states in a prearranged system. Officially, the presidency is expected to be impartial. 
Accordingly, most of the literature emphasizes the presidency’s role as neutral broker and negotiation 
facilitator. Although it is acknowledged that member states holding the presidency pursue their domestic 
agendas, many argue this does not have a decisive effect (Bassompierre 1988; Sherrington 2000; Westlake 
1995; Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997; Alexandrova/Timmermans 2013). However, there are also different 
views. Some claim that the presidency gives the government in charge extra influence
[…] the government that holds the presidency has considerable control of the legislative agenda inside 
the Council. Each government takes over the presidency with a central part of the presidency’s work 
program and will be on the agenda of all the key Council meetings. However, the presidency can only act 
on these issues if legislation is proposed by the Commission. Conversely, if the presidency does not like a 
Commission proposal, it can simply refuse to put it on the Council agenda. (Hix 2005: 80-81)
This assumption is also backed by empirical studies which show that holding the presidency does sig-
nificantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of the given member state (Tallberg 2006; 
Sherrington 2000; Tallberg 2010). “Independent of country size and economic power – on which formal 
voting power is based – presidencies in the voting stage have additional leverage in EU decision-making 
compared with other member states” (Schalk et al. 2007: 245). Warntjen (2008: 334) estimates that the 
“[…] increase in the probability of an outcome closer than expected owing to holding the presidency is 
similar to that resulting from having the support of the Commission.” Like with the European Council, all 
this evidence leads us to develop a model whereby we can take into account the impact of the presidency 
for the Council of Ministers.
The Council is generally meant to decide by consensus and any government can block an initiative that is 
against its interest. There are two basic voting rules in the Council:
Unanimity, where each member state has one vote and legislation cannot be passed if one or more mem-
ber states veto it. As a result of the “Luxembourg compromise” this was the (informal) rule in the Council 
until the Single European Act (SEA) came into force (Teasdale 1993).
Qualified-majority voting (QMV), where votes are weighted according to the size of a member state’s pop-
ulation, and an over-sized majority is required for legislation to be passed. This applies to an increasing 
number of areas.
The voting under unanimity rule is operationalized as the midpoint between the two most extreme posi-
tions, because these ministers must reach a compromise. Any deviation from this compromise would lead 
the more disadvantaged minister to block the decision. Within this range all other minister’s ideal points 
are closer to the midpoint, hence they are absorbed. Formally, the position is:
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      (8)
Explanations: CouPo
Unanimity
 = Position of the Council of Ministers under unanimity; Cm
Min
 = policy position 
of the leftmost portfolio minister of EU member states; Cm
Max
 = policy position of the right-most portfolio 
minister of EU member states
The commencement of the Single European Act on 1 July 1987 saw a rise of voting under QMV rule. 
Subsequently, we model the decision-making of the Council of Economic and Financial Affairs under QMV. 
We start from the position of the Council member who holds the presidency. This member of the Council 
looks for the closest member of the Council, second closest etc. to his or her own position until a qualified 
majority has been reached. The final position of the Council is the mean of those Council members which 




 = Position of the Council of Ministers under QMV; CouPres = policy position of the 
Presidency of Council of Ministers; Cm = policy position of the portfolio minister of EU member states.
This model holds until 2010. In order to improve consistency, the Lisbon Treaty established the cooperation 
of three successive presidencies, known as presidency trios. This weakens the impact of the current presi-
dency to some extent although it still remains the agenda setter. To reflect this change, the position of the 
Council since 2010 is estimated in two steps. Because there is a lack of empirical research on how these 
new rules work, the following suggestions are somewhat ambiguous. The starting point is the position of 
the rotating presidency whereby the current presidency has a weight of three, while the preceding and suc-
cessive presidencies have a weight of one. From this compromise, the presidency trio looks for the closest 
member of the Council, second closest etc. until a qualified majority has been reached:
     (10)
  (11)
Explanation: CouPo = Position of the Council of Ministers; CouRotPres = Position of rotating Presidency 




 = Successive Presidencies; 
Cport = Portfolio minister of EU member states.
Table 1 shows the voting weights of the ministers of each country in the Council of Ministers from 1958 to 
2012. It also shows the required quorum for a qualified majority and the threshold of a blocking minority.
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Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 5 12 12
France 4 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Germany 4 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Italy 4 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 5 13 13
Great Britain 10 10 10 10 10 29 29
Ireland 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Denmark 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Greece 5 5 5 5 12 12
Portugal 5 5 5 12 12
Spain 8 8 8 27 27
Austria 4 4 10 10
Finland 3 3 7 7
Sweden 4 4 10 10
Cyprus 2 4 4
Czech Republic 5 12 12
Estonia 3 4 4
Hungary 5 12 12
Latvia 3 4 4
Lithuania 3 7 7
Malta 2 3 3
Poland 3 27 27
Slovakia 3 7 7
Slovenia 3 4 4
Bulgaria 10
Romania 14
Total 17 58 63 76 87 124 321 345
Qualified majority 12 41 45 54 62 88 232 255
(as a % of the vote) 70.5 70.6 71.4 71.0 70.9 72.2 73.9
Blocking minority 6 18 19 23 26 37 90 91
(as a % of the vote) 33.3 31.0 30.1 30.2 29.8 29.8 28.0 26.4
Explanations: * Under the Treaty of Nice a triple majority is required: (1) a qualified majority, (2) a majority 
of states, and (3) 62 per cent of the population of the member states. Additionally, a blocking minority 
needs the support of four states.
Source: Authors.
22 | KFG Working Paper No. 65| October 2015 
The position of each country is determined by its government decision-making rule,16 that is, for the Council 
of Ministers the position of each minister either refers to the programmatic position of the minister (minis-
ter model), a negotiated position of governments with a strong prime minister (prime minister model),17 or 
the weighted average of the coalition parties (collective government model). As with the Commission, the 
Council of Ministers is also an agent of the European Council. Similar to the position of the Commission, we 
use the unweighted mean position between the European Council and the Council of Ministers:
       (12)
Figure 3 shows the empirical results for the left-right dimension.18 Right positions dominate and mirror 
the trends observed in the European Council. The early to mid-1970s saw a left move as social democratic 
parties led several governments (for example in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands), or 
at least participated in coalitions (Ireland, Italy). However, by the late 1970s, left positions became the 
exception rather than a rule. In the second half of 1983, under the Greek presidency of Akritidis and Lazaris 
(PASOK) succeeded by the French government, a coalition of social democrats and communists brought 
Left positions to the forefront for the last time during our period of analysis. 1986 to 1988 witnessed 
four conservative governments in a row: the UK under Mrs. Thatcher, a Belgian four-party coalition under 
Christian democratic leadership, and the Danish and German conservative-liberal coalitions, moving the 
Council of Ministers to the most Right-wing position it has held thus far.
The reverse is true for the late 1990s: The UK under Tony Blair, a social democratic Austrian coalition and 
Germany’s “red-green coalition” under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder moderated the Council’s position. 
However, the Danish presidency from 2002 marked a turning point towards the right once again. In sum, 
for most of the time the Council of Ministers held Right-wing positions. As is the case in the European 
Council, the rotating presidency sometimes leads to sharp contrasts. The need for compromise under QMV, 
however, usually moderates the position.
16 Relying on data on the strength of prime ministers (O’Malley 2007; Strøm et al. 2003) and ministerial autonomy 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009) a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method has been conducted in order to 
identify decision-making rules of governments (for a detailed description and analysis see Jahn 2016). The cluster 
analysis collects all Westminster democracies as well as Spain, Denmark, Portugal and France in one cluster; this is 
a group of countries with strong PMs. The second cluster is made up of Austria, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Belgium, all of which are countries with a strong tradition in collective cabinet decision-making. The 
last cluster includes Germany, Italy and Greece, where ministers have substantial autonomy over their portfolio. 
In the absence of reliable data for the new member states government positions have been estimated as the 
weighted mean (collective decision-making). For Cyprus the position reflects the position of the president, who 
has almost exclusive power (Ker-Lindsay 2009).
17 A strong prime minister negotiates a position with each coalition partner (that is mean weighted by seats) individ-
ually; the final position is the simple mean of all negotiations.
18 For the Council of Economic and Financial Affairs, we use the Minister of Finance if there is no Minister for Economic 
Affairs. If neither of them exists in a given country, we use the minister for Industry/Trade, or ultimately the govern-
ment position. See Appendix C for alternative models.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Position of Economic and Financial Affairs Council Position of presidency
Maximum position Minimum position
Source: Authors.
In sum, right positions dominate although not as clearly as in the European Council. Meanwhile, bi-annual 
changes in the presidency have led to frequent and fundamental changes in positions. 
3.4 The European Parliament (EP)
The status of the EP in the political system of the EU is more like the US Congress than any domestic 
parliament in Europe. The EP is not required to support a government nor is there an EU-government to 
enforce its wishes on a supporting majority in the EP. That makes the EP relatively independent. Like the US 
Congress, the EP is needed to pass legislation. However, the formal status of the EP is much weaker than 
that of the US Congress, although its impact on the legislative process has increased over time (see below).
Since 1979, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected in EU-wide elections every five years. 
The MEPs form party groups, joining forces with national parties. The work of the MEPs becomes more 
difficult to coordinate than in the US Congress due to the larger number of party groups in the EP and the 
fact that loyalties of the MEPs are spread over many domestic parties, thus making a coherent strategy in 
the EP difficult. Although in general voting behavior has become more cohesive over time, most studies 
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stress the fact that MEPs – trapped between two principles – are more likely to adhere to their national 
parties, when forced to make “hard decisions” (Bowler/Farrell 1993; Norris/Franklin 1997; Hix 2002; Faas 
2003).19 One major reason for this is that the national party leadership is responsible for the re-election 
of an MEP, rather than his or her party group in the EP. A study comparing the policy positions of national 
parties and party groups in the EP, shows that the position on basic policy dimensions such as left-right are 
rather similar in the national parties and the respective party groups in the EU. The study concludes that 
“[…] party and policy competition in the EP is an extension of national politics by other means” (McElroy/
Benoit 2010: 396).
The EP votes according to absolute majority rule. That makes the modeling of the ideological position of 
the EP (EPPo) rather simple:
        (13)
Explanations: EPPo = Position of European Parliament; MEP = policy position of the Member of European 
Parliament.
The ideological position of the EP is the position of the median MEP within an ideological dimension. The 
function of the EP and the policy incentives of the MEPs make it unlikely that the MEPs negotiate their 
positions. Therefore, we prefer the formal position (median) over a negotiated position (mean).20
In terms of the left-right dimension, the European Parliament has clearly been an advocate of right-wing 
positions (Figure 4). They were particularly strong during the early 1980s and after the mid-1990s. Only 
after 2004 did right-wing positions become a bit more moderate. There was a short episode of slightly 
leftist positions between 1987 and 1992. 
19 Or as Faas (2003: 859) puts it: “the more centralized the candidate selection process is, the more likely affected 
MEPs are to defect; the less supportive party supporters are, the more likely affected MEPs are to defect; the more 
the national party engages in monitoring its MEPs, the more likely affected MEPs are to defect; the more par-
ty-centered an electoral system is, the more likely affected MEPs are to defect; and if a party is part of the national 
government, the affected MEPs are again more likely to defect”.
20 Nevertheless, in Appendix D both modellings are compared.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Position of European Parliament
Maximum position Minimum position
Source: Authors.
After having identified the position of the European Council, the Commission, the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament, we turn now to the question of determining the position of the EU.
4. The Legislative Process in the European Union
The legislative process is officially made up by the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. Because the European Council is not involved in the legislative process in this section, we refer 
to the Council of Ministers as the Council. However, the legislative process of the EU is difficult to model 
for macro-comparative analyses. It is not enough to know the preferences and rules of the European insti-
tutions. Even with knowledge of the rules challenges remain because these have changed over time and 
decision-making processes are not highly institutionalized and stable. In addition, different rules apply 
for various issues and policy fields. What is particularly difficult is trying to estimate the impact of the 
interplay between and within the various committees designed by the Council and composed of national 
government officials (Vos 1997; Hage 2007). This system of committees has been called “comitology” and 
was established by a Council decision in July 1987, at the same time as the Single European Act entered into 
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force.21 By 2000 there were already more than 200 committees. There are various procedures (advisory, 
management, regulatory, safeguard, Council itself) that determine how these committees work and how 
much discretion is given to the Commission.
Comitology has been criticized for being opaque, largely due to the secretive nature of the committee 
proceedings. Hix and Høyland (2011: 37) summarize the effects of comitology: 
Under some procedures of the comitology system there is a separation of powers, whereby the legisla-
tors (the governments) can scrutinize the executive (the Commission). Under other procedures, however, 
comitology has created a fusion of powers, whereby the member governments can in some respects 
enforce their wishes on the Commission, and so exercise both legislative and executive authority.
The committees and the Commission cooperate in their work and the Council invites Commissioners be-
fore the Commission drafts proposals. This close cooperation between committees and the Commission re-
sults in a situation where “[…] the Commission can probably predict exactly how each committee will react 
to each draft implementing measure, and therefore drafts each measure accordingly” (Hix 2005: 57). This 
anticipatory behavior to formulate rejection-proof legislations leads to a situation where most proposals 
initiated by the Commission are adopted by the Council – an unusually high proportion for legislative poli-
tics (König 2007: 427).22 While the EP has recently begun to involve itself – especially after 1999, when the 
number of procedures was reduced and again in 2006, when the new “regulatory procedure with scrutiny” 
gave the EP a right to veto a decision – its impact vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council is still limited. In 
addition, first empirical assessments show that, while the EP succeeded on paper, it (still) underperforms 
when it comes to practical implementation (Christiansen/Dobbels 2012).23
It is not surprising that the complex legislative decision-making of the EU leads to considerable disagree-
ment among scholars on how to interpret it. There are spate articles even today which ask “Who has the 
power in the EU?” (Thomson/Hosli 2006; Barr/Passarelli 2009). When modeling the position of the EU and 
analyzing its legislative process, we have relied mainly on formal models (Tsebelis/Garrett 2000; Thomson/
Hosli 2006; Hix/Høyland 2011). However, these models are not directly suitable for general analyses for 
several reasons: Firstly, they are often interested in European integration and assume certain positions of 
the institutions (that the Commission and EP is more integrationist than the Council) which are contested 
by others (Hooghe 2001; Warntjen et al. 2008; Hix/Høyland 2011). Secondly, the models are strongly de-
pendent on estimations of the status quo (Garrett 1995: 296). The status quo is usually assumed to be 
21 It was reformed in June 1999, shortly after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into effect.
22 König (2007) concludes for the period from 1984-1999 that 76 percent of proposals are adopted by the Council. 
However, because he applies an event data analysis, it is not clear whether the pending proposals are counted as 
‘not adopted’. Hix (2005: 56) reports that from the 4,357 proposed measures of the Commission in 2000, only four 
unfavorable opinions were expressed by the committees of national experts and only six referrals were made to 
the Council.
23 Döring (2007: 210) states that too much attention has been given to the legislative role of the EP. One reason 
for this is that Tsebelis (1994) published a widely read article in which he modeled a situation in which the EP 
may have conditional agenda-setting power. This interpretation is contested among other scholars of EU policy. 
Furthermore, the condition under which the EP might have conditional agenda-setting power is rare and should 
therefore not be of major interest to this study.
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non-integrationist, an assumption which may be feasible but has never been tested empirically. In other 
policy fields besides European integration, it is not possible to assume a status quo on a certain position. 
Therefore, we need a model of decision-making which is independent from an assumed status quo. Thirdly, 
models of decision-making in the EU often only consider formal aspects and ignore informal processes. 
The process of comitology has been ignored by these models.24 They thereby overestimate the role of the 
Commission and grant it the role of sole agenda-setter. 
In order to analyze the position of the EU from 1966 to 2012, we take the changes following the Single 
European Act (SEA; entered into force on 1 July 1987), the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty; 
1 November 1993), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 1999), and the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009) 
into account. 
(a) The Legislative Process under the Luxembourg Compromise: Before the SEA in 1987, the legislative deci-
sion-making in the EU happened according to the “Luxembourg Compromise”, which had been introduced 
in 1966 as a method to solve the deadlock between France and the other members. It was an informal 
agreement stating that, when a decision was subject to qualified majority voting, the commission would 
postpone a decision if any member state felt that important national interests were under threat. Because 
most decisions affected the national interests of the member states, this had the effect that unanimity was 
needed most of the time. 
The legislative procedure began with the Commission initiating a proposal after general drafts had been 
discussed and consultation with state governments had been conducted. Afterwards the Council was con-
sulted and the EP gave its opinion. Therefore, the Council had already influenced the proposal at a stage 
where a final legislation had not yet been drafted. The EP had no formal power in the consultation proce-
dure. Legislation was only sent to the EP for consultation and the EP could not change or veto any initiative. 
Eventually, the Council would decide by unanimity or QMV to accept or reject the proposal. Amendments 
had to be made by unanimity. Since the Council was involved in drafting the Commission’s proposal and 
later decided on it, it is fair to say that the Council’s position could be taken as the position of the EU (EUPO) 
until 30 June 1987. 25
        (14)
24 In his evaluation of various decision-making models, Achen (2006a; 2006b) points out that models relying simply 
on formal rules perform worse than models which take informal procedures into account: “The lesson is that 
procedural models need theoretical extension. They need to take into account not just the formal rules, but also 
the informal processes that make up so much of what politicians do” (Achen 2006a: 298). The challenge here is, 
however, how to capture informal processes in a formal model and how to weigh these with respect to formal 
rules. We include informal processes with respect to comitology and with respect to the role of the member state 
holding the presidency (see above).
25 This conclusion is confirmed by the results of formal models and expert judgments. Concerning the former, 
Tsebelis and Garrett (2000: 12-13) state: “Effective decision-making power thus rested with the member govern-
ment that had the least desire to change the status quo.” With respect to a simulation with data on the power of 
the Commission, Council and EP, Thomas and Hosli (2006: 412) conclude: “For issues subject to consultation with 
the EP and unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers, the best-fitting power scores are those that attribute all 
power to the Council and none to the Commission and EP.”
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(b) The Legislative Process under the Single European Act (SEA): The legislative decision under the SEA 
between 1987 and 1993 was called cooperation procedure. Through the SEA the Commission was granted 
a stronger influence. The decision-making process occured as follows: The Commission made a proposal; 
the European Parliament issued its opinion in a first reading; after obtaining the EP’s opinion, the Council 
adopted the proposal with a qualified majority – known as the Common Position; if the Council wanted 
to amend the proposal, it needed an unanimous vote, meaning that it was easier to accept or reject a 
proposal than to amend it; the Common Position was then sent to a second reading to the EP; if the EP ap-
proved the Common Position or had not come to a decision within three months, the Council could adopt 
it as a legislative act; the EP could then reject the proposal by absolute majority which the Council could 
overrule only through unanimity and within three months.
In order to model the above cooperation procedure, the positions of the legislative process need to be cal-
culated in four steps: (a) the position of the Common Position, (b) the position after the second reading of 
the EP, (c) the revised Common Position by the Commission, and finally (d) the position of the cooperation 
procedure as a result of the revised Common Position and the position of the Council.
The Commission is not a sovereign agenda-setter but reaches its position through negotiation and consul-
tation with the Council. Empirical studies (Thomson/Hosli 2006: 409) show that the Council has a power 
score around three times higher than that of the Commission. In other words, the proposal already re-
flects the position of the Council to a large degree. As a consequence, in this model the proposal of the 
Commission and the Common Position are identical in analytical terms.26
     (15)
The Common Position is then sent to the EP for a second reading, which decides with an absolute majority, 
that is the median parliamentarian is decisive. Normally proposals are accepted or amended. In most cases 
they are amended (4,500 from 1987 to 1993 (Tsebelis/Garrett 2000: 19)), which for our analysis means:
    (16)
The Commission can accept or reject the amendments of the EP and thus influences the position of the 
legislature for a second time. We assume that, if the position of the EP brings the Common Position closer 
to the position of the Commission, it accepts the amendments. If this is not the case, then it rejects the 
amendments of the EP and maintains the position of the original Common Position. The modified Common 
Position 2 thus grants the Commission large discretion. Formally, we can summarize this step in the legis-
lative process as follows:
  (17) 
26 See Appendix E for alternative weightings of the Common Position.
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This decision of the Commission can be adopted by the Council through QMV (or in some cases unanimity). 
However, the Council can only amend it by unanimity. The amended Common Position must be formulated 
in such a way that the Council will still accept it. In other words, the Council once again influences the result, 
which in turn is anticipated by the Commission. We model this adjustment by weighting the amended 
Common Position with regard to the position of the Council:
    (18)
Under this cooperation procedure, the power of the Commission increased because it could influence 
the proposal and outcome twice: for the first time by formulating the original proposal (together with the 
Council in the comitology process) and a second time, concerning the acceptance of the amendments of 
the EP. The EP also received conditional agenda setting power depending how it placed its amendments 
(Tsebelis 1994; Tsebelis et al. 2001). If the Commission and the EP worked together (the Commission ac-
cepts the amendments of the EP), then they were strong actors in the legislative process of the EU, even if 
ultimately most of the power still lay in the hands of the Council.
(c) The Legislative Process under the Co-Decision I Procedure: From 1 November 1993 until 30 April 1999, 
the legislative procedure was mainly decided in a co-decision procedure. The co-decision model introduced 
by the Maastricht Treaty has been called co-decision I procedure; it was later revised by the Amsterdam 
Treaty (known as co-decision II). The intention was to better integrate the EP in the decision-making pro-
cess through allowing the Council and EP to co-decide over the proposals of the Commission (Jensen 
2011). There were two major institutional differences between the cooperation procedure and co-deci-
sion I. Firstly, the Council could not reject the EP amendments accepted by the Commission. Instead, a 
Conciliation Committee comprising all members of the Council and numerically equal representation from 
the EP had to discuss the amendments and agree on a joint text. Secondly, if the Conciliation Committee 
could not agree on a joint text, the Council could reaffirm its prior Common Position. The Council proposal 
became law unless an absolute majority of the MEPs vetoed it.
This means that the first steps in co-decision I are similar to those under the cooperation procedure. After 
that, the Conciliation process starts. This process gives the Council considerable power because it can 
choose which version of the proposal it wants to accept. It can approve all or part of the amendments 
of the EP, or it can reject them and decide for the Common Position. This turns “[…] the Council into an 
unconstrained agenda setter under co-decision I because it could essentially propose to the Parliament any 
variation of its common position that it wanted” (Tsebelis/Garrett 2000: 23). Therefore, our model for the 
co-decision I procedure is as follows:
      (19)
The Common Position might be the most likely outcome under co-decision I because it is closest to the 
position of the Council, given that the Commission still has the right to initiate proposals.27 The EP has little 
27 However, to recall, this proposal is the Common Proposal from the Commission and the Council where the Council 
dominates 100:33 as a result of comitology.
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effect in the co-decision I procedure. If the Treaty of Maastricht “[…] intended to make the Parliament a 
co-equal legislator […], the procedure […] failed to achieve this objective” (Tsebelis/Garrett 2000: 23).
(d) The Legislative Process under the Co-Decision II Procedure: From 1 April 1999 until early 2003, the 
co-decision I procedure was modified in favor of the EP, as per the Treaty of Amsterdam from October 1997. 
The co-decision II procedure differed from its predecessor in that the last two steps in co-decision I were 
dropped (the Council’s final proposal to the Parliament, and Parliament’s decision whether to reject it). In 
other words, the Conciliation Committee became the final step in co-decision II. This had consequences for 
the outcome of the legislative process in the EU. Because the members of the Council and an equal number 
of MEPs now sat on the Conciliation Committee, the EU position under the co-decision II procedures lay 
between these two institutions. Without further information, the outcome could be halfway between 
the position of the Council’s pivot and the EP median: “[…] the Council and EP will probably agree to split 
the difference between the Council’s common position and the EP’s ideal point […]” (Hix 2005: 105). The 
formal decision model is:
     (20)
Such a model does not take the position of the Commission into account. Even if the Commission partici-
pates in the initial proposal (formally 100 percent, informally through comitology, at around one third), the 
compromise between Council and EP, after rejecting the Common Position, excludes the Commission. In 
a simulation model based on expert judgments of the power of the Commission, Council and EP, the best 
estimates of balance of power under co-decision II is 15 to the Commission, 100 to the Council and 25 to 
the EP (Thomson/Hosli 2006: 413). This model takes into account the informal power of the Commission, 
which is excluded from models that analyze the formal legislative process.
(e) The Legislative Process after the Nice Treaty: The Treaty of Nice entered into effect on 1 February 2003. 
It has also had an effect on the relative power of the Council and EP. However, the Nice Treaty has not 
changed the operation of the legislative procedures, but has made it more difficult to adopt legislation in 
the Council under reformed weightings of votes. This has reduced the ability of the EP to propose amend-
ments that are acceptable to the Council resulting in yet another increase in the power of the Council. 
In summation, we agree with Tsebelis and Garrett (2001: 372-376) that the Commission lost power as 
the cooperation procedures were altered from co-decision I to co-decision II. However, while our models 
suggest that the Commission had no power before 1987, Tsebelis and Garrett (2001: 374) conclude that 
the Commission had “[…] considerable influence over the legislative outcomes […]”. The difference is that 
we consider unanimous voting in the Council – which is by far the most common before 1987 – whereas 
Tsebelis and Garrett analyze exclusively QMV.28 We do agree that under cooperation the Commission 
28 As Crombey and Hix (2011) state: “[…]the Commission considered only policies that the most conservative mem-
ber state preferred to the status quo, and proposed the policy it preferred most from amongst those policies. The 
Commission thus had limited ‘agenda-setting power’ before the SEA.” According to Thomas and Hosli (2006: 410), 
the Council voting procedure makes a huge difference. As mentioned above, under unanimous voting the Council 
holds all power while the Commission and EP hold none. However, under qualified majority voting within the con-
sultation procedure the best-fitting power scores are 30 for the Commission 15 for the EP and 100 for the Council.
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has to share power with the EP. However, here the Commission has an impact on the initial proposal 
through comitology and through the amendments made by the EP. These might move the proposal closer 
to the Commission, before it is once again moved towards the position of the Council. The position of the 
Commission remains strong under co-decision I, as the most likely outcome is the common position with 
the Council. However, it loses most of its power in the co-decision II procedure, except its power to formu-
late the initial proposal in cooperation with the Council through the comitology process.
The impact of the EP on the legislative process is the reverse to that of the Commission. The EP had no 
impact under the consultation procedure. It increased its impact under the cooperation procedure in cases 
where its amendments were accepted by the Commission. Under co-decision I, it has again lost all impact 
because the final outcome is the Common Position between the Commission and Council. The EP has the 
highest impact under co-decision II. Here its position counts as much as the position of the Council.
The Council’s power position also changed over the course of the various legislative rules. It was stron-
gest under consultation with unanimity rule. It was probably weakest under the cooperation procedure 
when the Commission and EP had conditional agenda-setting power (Tsebelis 1994). It was strong again 
under the co-decision I procedure. Here the Common Position is most likely to pass and, according to our 
interpretation, the Council’s impact is around 70 percent. The Council again lost impact in co-decision II 
according to which it has to share power with the EP (50 percent).
Some hypothetical scenarios illustrate the effect of our models. In scenario 1 let us assume that the 
Council’s pivot is rather extreme to one side (3 on a scale from 0 to 10), and the Commission (10) and EP (9) 
are clearly on the other side. These are the typically assumed positions on European integration. The re-
sults for the final EU position are: 3.0 under consultation, 4.94 under cooperation, 4.75 under co-decision 
I and 6.0 under co-decision II. This is a result which is confirmed by most studies.
In scenario 2, the Council (1) works together with the EP (2) against the Commission (10). The final positions 
are 1.0 under consultation, 2.13 under cooperation, 3.25 under co-decision I and 1.5 under co-decision II. 
If we reverse the picture and assume the Council (1) and the Commission (2) stand in opposition to the EP 
(10), the final positions are 1.0 under consultation, 1.13 under cooperation, 1.25 under co-decision I and 
5.5 under co-decision II. Finally, if we move the Council to the middle (5) and place the EP on one side (1) 
and the Commission on the other (9) (scenario 4), we see the relative impact of the EP and the Commission 
over time. In the first case the result is: 5.0 under consultation, 5.5 under cooperation, 6.0 under co-deci-
sion I and 3.0 under co-decision II.
Under consultation, the Council solely determines the position. Under cooperation, the Commission is 
able to move the result slightly to its ideal position, even if the Council and the EP agree more or less on 
their position, and especially if the EP and Commission stand in opposition to each other (scenario 4). 
This effect is much stronger under co-decision I. The power of the EP and the Commission correlate nega-
tively. This means that the EP is weakest under co-decision I, which is confirmed by the literature. This has 
changed fundamentally under co-decision II, where the Commission has lost power to the EP. The Council 
has lost impact in each new decision-making procedure in our examples. However, until co-decision I the 
Council benefited more when working together with the Commission than with the EP. In contrast, under 
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co-decision II the Council is better advised to cooperate with the EP. Unsurprisingly, apart from consulta-
tion the EP and the Commission are stronger if they unite against the Council. Figure 5 visualizes the effect 
of the different decision-making rules of the EU.
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When we take the positions of the European Council, Commission, Council of Economic and Financial 
Affairs and the European Parliament together and apply them to the legislative procedures outlined above, 
this leads to the position of the EU in the left-right dimensions shown by the bold line in Figure 6.29
29  Appendix F assesses the impact of each modelling decision on the final position of the EU by comparing alternative 
specifications.
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In the left-right dimension, the EU positions moved from the Left in the 1970s to the right from the 1980s 
until the end of the period of analysis. All institutions followed this trend and clear left positions could be 
witnessed for the last time in the mid-1970s. From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, of all European institutions 
the Commission often leaned most strongly to the right. Although the EP was more left-leaning from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, on average it is the most right leaning European institution. From the mid-
1980s until the end of the 1990s, the European Council and the Council of economic ministers leaned to 
the right more than all other European institutions. In other periods both institutions took middle positions, 
but on average the European Council is more right-leaning than the Council of Ministers.
5. Conclusion
This study presents an analytical index to estimate the position of the EU in relevant policy dimensions and 
is therefore suitable for macro-comparative studies, which wish to assess the impact of the EU on domestic 
policies and outcomes. This index is therefore a basic building block for analyzing the transformative power 
of the EU.
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The major task of this paper is to illustrate the construction and computation of this index. As an illustration 
we provide empirical data on EU positions in the left-right dimension from 1966 to 2012. The index and our 
data are thus suited for more sophisticated theory testing in macro-comparative analysis.
Macro-comparative analysis is not usually well equipped to analyze the potential impact of the EU on its 
member states. Most often scholars use a dummy variable to determine the EU’s impact. This is deficient 
because a dummy variable for EU-membership is not able to determine the various ways in which the EU 
impacts upon its member states. Furthermore, dummy variables are proxies or numeric stand-ins for quali-
tative or more complex variables, which are difficult to measure. One can never be sure whether the dummy 
variable might not also cover other effects, which in turn have nothing to do with EU membership. It is 
therefore better to obtain a metric and time-variant variable. Estimating the position of the EU according to 
intra- and inter-institutional decision-making procedures is therefore an attempt to deliver such a variable.
By estimating a single EU position one may object that the EU is no unitary actor. As our analysis has shown, 
this assumption is certainly true. Many actors with various preferences are involved in European politics, 
who obey to decision-making rules that do not seem to follow a coherent underlying principle. Various 
actors involved in European decision-making have laid out decision-making rules and established a com-
prehensive system of informal interventions. However, at the end of the day the EU exercises an influence 
on its member states in various policy fields. Either one believes that this influence is anarchic, ambiguous 
and unpredictable, which implies that empirical analysis is almost impossible, or one believes that the 
complex interaction of various actors has a definable impact on member states. We start out from the latter 
assumption and claim that we can estimate a position of the EU. However, future studies will have to show 
whether the hypothesis that the EU has a predicable impact on its member states or even non-member 
states (which is actually assumed when using an EU-dummy variable) is correct.
The index developed in this paper can be used to address research questions, which so far have not been 
sufficiently addressed. For instance, using the EU position in relation to the positions of the governments 
of the EU member states leads to an annual and country-specific index of ideological misfit. One could 
claim that if the misfit is of substantial size then the EU pushes the policy of a member state more strongly 
towards its own position, than if the misfit were small. Such an analysis would be more specific and ana-
lytically superior than simply using a dummy variable, which cannot distinguish the specific impact of the 
EU on its member states.
The analysis of ideological misfit between the EU and its member states can also uncover intra-EU cleav-
ages. Is it the case that, if there is a tension between big and small states the EU position tends to be closer 
to the big states (for instance France and Germany), or is the EU position really a compromise between 
all member states? Furthermore, such a misfit analysis could also reveal cleavages between Northern and 
Southern or old and new member states. Analyzing such ideological misfit would help to identify under-
lying conflict lines within the EU and may help to find compromise between conflicting partner countries 
inside the EU.
Another way of using our indices would be to estimate the veto function of the EU. Such an analysis could 
be conducted at the level of domestic politics, on the one hand, or within the EU, on the other. In the 
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former case one can add the EU as an additional veto player. Thus far, this has only been achieved in the 
institutional analysis of veto points. In this tradition (for example Schmidt 1996; Colomer 1996) possible 
veto points are counted (for example second chambers, federalism, central bank autonomy, referenda, 
difficulty of amending the constitution) and the EU is considered one point on the scale.30 By using our 
index the EU can be analyzed as a veto player in a more sophisticated spatial analysis of veto players in 
the provenience of George Tsebelis (Jahn 2010). In the latter case one can calculate the ideological range 
between the individual EU institutions and, in doing so, estimate the likelihood of policy change in the EU 
(König/Pöter 2001). Such an analysis would be essential to estimate the reform capacity of the EU member 
states and to identify points of policy obstruction. 
Analyses of ideological misfit are already underway (Jahn/Düpont 2015). Apart from using the left-right 
policy dimension, which clearly dominates the ideological space of Western democracies, our indices can 
also be applied to other ideological dimensions or issue positions as well (for an application to environ-
mental politics see for example Jahn 2016). However, in this case the model would have to be adjusted. 
Analyzing other policy dimensions would not only require data on preferences (for instance on an environ-
mental dimension or on European integration) but also on the adjustment of the institutional framework 
(for instance, that the Commissioner with the environmental portfolio or the Council of Environmental 
Ministers is considered).31 However, because there is a substantial debate on measuring policy positions 
and decision rules (see for instance Benoit/Laver 2012; Slapin 2014; Leinaweaver/Thomson 2014), the do-
files are organized so that researchers can use their own ideological variables (either positions on different 
policy dimensions and issues, or using alternative data from expert judgments, formal analysis, etc.) and 
make adjustments to the institutional framework of decision-making. Although we think that our approach 
is already convincing, these tools grant a lot of freedom to various research interests.
30 For a thorough discussion of the inferiority of veto point analysis to veto player analysis see Jahn 2010. Furthermore, 
it is problematic to use such a count variable in regression models because its coefficient is often inflated. Textbook 
knowledge tells us to separate such variables into several dummy variables, which in turn would introduce the 
problems already mentioned at the beginning of the paper. 
31 Data with different operationalization, which are discussed in the appendix or which use the environmental policy 
dimension, can be downloaded from: http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de.
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Appendix A: European Council
In order to check the robustness of our modelling on the final position of the European Council we report 
alternative measures. Figure A1 shows seven alternative positions to that of the European Council: the 
bargaining model reproduces the model outlined in the main text. The mean model represents Achen’s 
(2006a) suggestion of an unweighted mean (of all prime ministers) in order to capture formal and informal 
decision-making in the absence of more detailed information (for an application see for example Warntjen 
et al. 2008), while the median model captures the position if the Council were to vote under absolute ma-
jority rule. The successive models show the final position if it were solely based on structural, institutional 
(presidency) or individual power (seniority).






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Bargaining model Mean model Median model
Weight: Population Weight: GDP Weight: Seniority
Weight: Institutional power
Source: Authors.
The bargaining model resembles structural power based on population and individual experience to a 
higher degree than the economic power of a country. In addition, the former two often counterbalance 
the power stemming from the presidency. This result is in line with Tallberg’s (2008) finding that especially 
the small and medium-sized states favor access to the presidency, but are outweighed by the bigger states. 
The pairwise correlations support this view (Table A1): Both the bargaining model and the mean model cor-
relate strongly (Pearson’s r = 0.951), and both show the highest correlation with structural power based on 
population and seniority. If the mean model represents formal and informal decision-making, this makes 
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us confident that our bargaining model is able to capture these processes within the European Council. The 
mean model, however, would downplay the influence of small and medium-sized states by ignoring the 
agenda-setting power of the presidency. Because the European Council decides under unanimity or QMV, 
and each country can veto a decision, the median model is inappropriate, as it would represent the final 
position under absolute majority rule. In line with this, the median model has the lowest correlation with 
the bargaining model and a weak one with the mean model.


















Mean model 0.951 1.000
Median model 0.827 0.870 1.000
Weight: 
Population
0.973 0.914 0.807 1.000
Weight:  
GDP
0.964 0.902 0.809 0.991 1.000
Weight: 
Seniority




0.882 0.824 0.679 0.767 0.747 0.792 1.000
Source: Authors.
If population and seniority matter, the question follows which countries have strong bargaining power? 
Table A2 reports descriptive statistics for each weight.
In terms of structural power, the table comes as no surprise: Population and economic strength do cor-
relate (Pearson’s r = 0.964), meaning that the larger states are able to draw the final position closer to 
their standpoint. However, both factors only correlate weakly with seniority (Pearson’s r = 0.203 and 0.311 
respectively). In line with Tallberg’s (2008: 690) notion that Italy is unable to translate its structural power 
into European influence because of its domestic political instability, we see that Italy scores very low on 
seniority, almost level with the Central and Eastern European countries. The latter, however, have only re-
cently become members of the European Union. So – by the logic of weight – their prime ministers have not 
had the chance to gain long-standing individual experience. Seniority thus partly bears the notion of the 
amount of time that one has been a member, but it mostly indicates political stability of governments: With 
Mr. Werner, Mr. Thorn, Mr. Santer and Mr. Juncker Luxembourg, for example, has only been represented by 
four prime ministers since 1964 (hence the highest score on seniority), while in the same time period Italy 
has been represented by 19 different prime ministers. This shows that (smaller) states profit from political 
stability and gain influence by being a reliable partner. As has already been mentioned above, one head of 
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government in Tallberg’s study (2008: 700) concludes: “Juncker probably weighs more than countries with 
12 to 14 million inhabitants.”
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Structural and Individual Power (on average since membership 2012)
Population GDP Seniority
Country Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Austria 1.93 1.68 2.14 0.21 2.37 2.20 2.70 0.13 0.39 0.18 0.75 0.18
Belgium 3.32 2.15 5.20 0.94 3.55 2.70 5.10 0.77 0.39 0.16 0.73 0.16
Bulgaria 1.50 1.47 1.54 0.03 0.29 0.25 0.31 0.02 0.34 0.25 0.42 0.07
Cyprus 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.38 0.25 0.49 0.09
Czech 
Republic
2.14 2.08 2.23 0.06 1.11 0.87 1.23 0.14 0.24 0.17 0.34 0.06
Denmark 1.55 1.11 1.97 0.30 2.18 1.83 2.83 0.29 0.44 0.18 0.74 0.17
Estonia 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.43 0.21 0.64 0.15
Finland 1.24 1.07 1.38 0.14 1.48 1.42 1.53 0.03 0.40 0.18 0.64 0.14
France 18.34 12.55 27.03 4.45 20.32 15.17 28.66 4.20 0.50 0.23 0.85 0.18
Germany 22.76 16.37 32.49 4.73 28.56 19.53 43.55 6.66 0.49 0.18 0.91 0.19
Greece 2.89 2.22 3.64 0.44 1.65 1.36 2.00 0.18 0.37 0.15 0.65 0.14
Hungary 2.08 1.99 2.21 0.09 0.79 0.75 0.84 0.03 0.27 0.18 0.40 0.07
Ireland 1.08 0.88 1.30 0.14 0.96 0.60 1.53 0.32 0.36 0.17 0.75 0.15
Italy 18.63 11.83 28.64 5.29 15.40 12.13 20.70 2.35 0.26 0.14 0.48 0.09
Latvia 0.45 0.41 0.50 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.27 0.16 0.43 0.10
Lithuania 0.66 0.60 0.74 0.05 0.22 0.17 0.26 0.03 0.35 0.18 0.48 0.10
Luxembourg 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.24 0.18 0.33 0.04 0.59 0.18 0.99 0.22
Malta 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.47 0.16 0.68 0.17
Netherlands 4.81 3.32 6.97 1.09 5.34 4.47 7.03 0.79 0.42 0.15 0.78 0.16
Poland 7.91 7.68 8.35 0.30 2.59 1.93 2.95 0.36 0.30 0.16 0.52 0.13
Portugal 2.64 2.11 3.12 0.35 1.34 1.03 1.50 0.13 0.42 0.17 0.70 0.15
Romania 4.12 4.02 4.29 0.10 1.03 1.00 1.12 0.04 0.31 0.15 0.45 0.12
Slovakia 1.11 1.08 1.17 0.04 0.50 0.43 0.55 0.05 0.37 0.20 0.62 0.15
Slovenia 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.01 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.02 0.30 0.18 0.45 0.10
Spain 10.58 9.10 11.97 0.98 7.69 6.55 8.90 0.70 0.52 0.18 0.84 0.17
Sweden 2.14 1.85 2.38 0.24 2.86 2.48 3.16 0.17 0.46 0.19 0.72 0.17
Great Britain 17.20 12.41 21.94 3.31 16.18 13.34 19.07 1.60 0.44 0.18 0.79 0.17
Total 7.30 0.08 32.49 8.26 7.30 0.04 43.55 9.04 0.42 0.14 0.99 0.18
Notes: Gray shaded values indicate the ten countries with the highest mean value on each weight. Sources: 
Population: EuroStat; GDP: World Bank; Seniority: own calculations.
Source: Authors.
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In sum, modeling the final position of the European Council as the simple mean or as based solely on struc-
tural power overestimates the impact of larger states and neglects institutional power stemming from the 
agenda-setting power of the presidency. In addition, by taking seniority into account we are able to capture 
both formal and informal decision-making within the European Council. While our bargaining model may 
not be completely free of ambiguity, it is line with evidence from qualitative studies.
Appendix B: European Commission
We assess the assumptions made in our decision-making model by comparing the bargaining model, as 
outlined in the main text, with the mean model, the median model, and the legislative model (Figure B1). 
The first three models are subject to the principal-agent relationship, whereas the legislative model shows 
the position of the European Commission if it were not an agent of the European Council (with that it 
conforms to most formal models in the field). It emerges that the Commission often takes more extreme 
positions, both to the left and to the right (legislative model), but is moderated or even counterbalanced 
by the European Council.






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Bargaining model Mean model Median model
Legislative model Position of European Council
Source: Authors.
When considering the pairwise correlations (Table B1) our bargaining model and the legislative model cor-
relate comparatively weakly (Pearson’s r = 0.835). Unsurprisingly, all correlations of the legislative model with 
the principal-agent models are relatively low, indicating the substantial impact of this modelling decision.
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Table B1: Pairwise Correlation of the Alternative Models
Bargaining model Mean model Median model Legislative model
Bargaining model 1.000
Mean model 0.859 1.000
Median model 0.898 0.971 1.000
Legislative model 0.835 0.489 0.547 1.000
Source: Authors.
The low correlations of the mean and median models show the consequences of modeling the commis-
sion as originating from the presidency and the commissioner responsible for the respective portfolio. In 
order to assess the influence of the decision to give equal weight to the president and the commissioner 
we report the position of the European Commission (without the principal-agent modelling) for three 
alternative models: Firstly the position, as detailed in the main text (equal weight), secondly, with almost 
all power given to the President (99:1) and thirdly with almost all power given to the Commissioner (1:99). 
From this ‘compromise’ a minimally connected winning coalition within the Commission is built. In the 
absence of information about the relative weight within the Commission, these measures represent ‘quasi 
confidence intervalls’, as all final positions lie within this range. Figure B2 thus sheds light on to the possible 
range of alternatives. Although there is considerable deviation, one should note, that the left-right scale 
ranges from -100 to +100. Against this background, the amplitude is much lower than one might suspect. 
Nevertheless, in Appendix F we show the impact of this decision by estimating the final position of the EU 
with both alternative weightings.






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Upper and lower boundary Bargaining modelSource: Authors.
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In sum, the most fundamental impact on the final position of the European Commission derives from the 
principal-agent relationship, while the different models within the Commission differ to a lesser degree.
Appendix C: Council of Ministers
Depending on the subject, the Council of Ministers basically votes under the qualified majority voting rule 
or the unanimity rule. Figure C1 therefore reports the following alternative models: the Council as detailed 
in the main text, the mean model, the Council solely under unanimity voting rule and QMV, under QMV 
weighted by votes, and the legislative model (that is, if the Council were not the agent of the European 
Council).
The difference of QMV and QMV weighted by votes is the consensus orientation of the presidency: Under 
QMV the presidency looks for a minimal connected winning coalition by taking the voting weights into ac-
count. However, once the temporary coalition has been established the final position is the simple mean of 
the coalition. In contrast, QMV weighted by votes takes these votes into account even when estimating the 
final position. The rationale behind our modelling decision is that the Council is generally meant to decide 
by consensus. The presidency thus favors a strong minimal connected partner over a minimal connected 
partner with less voting power, because it seeks to have as few partners as possible to reduce the need 
for compromise; nevertheless it respects each partner, as s/he might simply defect from the temporary 
coalition. This in turn would increase the range, as the presidency must co-operate with partners further 
away from its ideal point.
Table C1: Pairwise Correlation of the Alternative Models




Mean model 0.906 1.000
Unanimity 0.922 0.946 1.000
QMV weighted 
by votes
0.868 0.924 0.848 1.000
Legislative model 0.752 0.703 0.669 0.881 1.000
Source: Authors.
Table C1 shows the pairwise correlations of the five models. To model unanimity as the mean between the 
two extreme points comes close to the mean model, that is, both strongly reflect the idea of an exhaustive 
consensus. The low correlation of our bargaining model and QMV weighted by votes results from the fact 
that the Council was modelled under unanimity until 1987 (hence the higher correlation with the sole una-
nimity model). When looking at the correlation for the period from 1988 to 2012 only (when QMV became 
the rule), modelling QMV as an unweighted mean (as in the bargaining model) or weighted by votes does 
not fundamentally alter the final position (Pearson’s r = 0.907). The correlation of our bargaining model 
and the mean model (Pearson’s r = 0.906) is again in robust agreement, which makes us confident that our 
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model captures both formal and informal decision-making. Unsurprisingly, the legislative model sticks out 
as exhibiting very low correlation across all other models. This is supported by Figure C1, which plots all 
models in the left-right dimension.






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Bargaining model Mean model Unanimity voting rule
QMV weighted by votes Legislative model Position of European Council
 
Source: Authors.
Similar to the Commission, the Council of Minister has often proposed more extreme positions, but has 
been moderated by the European Council. The range of positions, however, is rather low. Thus, in sum, the 
most fundamental impact on the final position of the Council of Ministers stems from the decision to model 
the Council as the agent of the European Council, which mirrors the robustness tests for the Commission in 
Appendix A. Unanimity seems to capture the consensus idea as well as the mean model, while the voting 
weights (although formally important) do not alter the final position to any substantial degree.
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Appendix D: European Parliament
The European Parliament is not an agent of the European Council, so there is only one alternative model to 
discuss, namely the consensus oriented mean model. However, given the fact that the European Parliament 
decides under majority rule, this model seems less appropriate. Figure D 1 shows the mean model along-
side the median model for both dimensions (the pairwise correlation of both models is quite low with 
Pearson’s r = 0.639). Except for the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the mean model is more 
moderate than the bargaining model, which uses the median as the pivotal position. This means that the 
mean model is less extreme in its right-wing positions than the bargaining model.






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Bargaining model Mean model
Source: Authors.
Looking at the robustness tests of the various models of intra-institutional decision-making, one can con-
clude that the major difference between them is whether one operationalizes the Commission and the 
Council as an agent of the European Council. From our point of view it makes sense to use a principal-agent 
model, but there might also be good reasons to ignore the European Council. However, depending upon 
which position the individual researcher takes on this issue, this may (substantially) alter the inferences 
drawn. 
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Appendix E: Common Position
Although empirical studies (Thomson/Hosli 2006: 409) show that the Council of Ministers has a power 
score around three times higher than that of the Commission under the cooperation procedure (1987-
1993) and co-decision I (1993-1999), one could disagree with this conclusion. In order to show the impact 
of this decision, we estimate three alternatives (leaving the principal-agent model aside): The bargaining 
model, as described in the text, gives three times more power to the Council than to the Commission 
(Figure E1). The second model gives equal weight to both, while the third reverses the picture, that is, the 
Commission is three times more powerful. The last two models estimate power ratios of 99:1 and 1:99. 
As is explained in Appendix B, these represent ‘quasi confidence intervals’, and thus the possible range of 
values.






1985 1990 1995 2000
Upper and lower boundary Bargaining model
Equal weight Power to Commission (3:1)
Source: Authors.
The pairwise correlations (Table E1) support the view that the Council of Ministers is indeed more powerful, 
because the correlations of the bargaining model and the equal weighting are much higher compared 
to the model in which the Commission has more power. In sum, the Council is usually able to draw the 
common position closer to its own ideal point. However, even under equal weighting the impact of this 
decision is marginal, particularly if one recalls that the left-right scale ranges from -100 to +100. Advocates 
who see the Commission as the most powerful European institution in determining the common position 
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may come to different conclusions, since correlation with the bargaining model, but also with the equal 
weight model, is substantially lower.
Table E1: Pairwise Correlations of Alternative Weightings
Bargaining model Equal weight Power to Commission
LR
Bargaining model 1.000
Equal weight 0.925 1.000
Power to Commission 0.627 0.876 1.000
Source: Authors.
Appendix F: Final Position of the European Union
Each modelling decision influences the final outcome. Therefore, we assess their impact by comparing the 
bargaining model, as outlined throughout the main text, with the mean model, the median model, and the 
legislative model (Figure F1). Given formal decision rules, the former two seem inappropriate to be applied 
to every institution. Nevertheless, within the mean model, each institution’s position is the unweighted 
mean, whereas the median model reflects each institution under majority voting rules. Finally, the legisla-
tive model reports the final position if the European Council was not to have any impact, and neither the 
Commission nor the Council of Ministers were agents of the head of states. In a second step we show the 
impact of the two most controversial weighting decisions on the final position (Figure F 2), namely the 
weighting between the president and the commissioner within the European Commission (see Appendix 
B for more details), and the weighting between the Commission and the Council of Ministers with respect 
to the common position (see Appendix E for further details).
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Bargaining model Mean model
Median model Legislative model
Source: Authors.
As has been noted in the preceding appendices, the biggest impact stems from the decision to model 
the Commission and Council of Ministers as agents of the European Council. Especially in the 1980s the 
European Union would have been more left-leaning while later it would have been closer in line with all 
other models. In sum, while the EU would usually propose more extreme positions, it is moderated by 
the European Council. The figure also shows that the bargaining model, the median and the mean model 
are ultimately close in line. This is supported by the pairwise correlations (Table F1): All correlations are 
greater than 0.93. It then comes as a bit of a surprise to see that the legislative model closely resembles 
our bargaining model, when we take all European institutions, as well as all intra- and inter-institutional 
decision-makings, into account. The median model deviates most strongly from the bargaining model. The 
legislative model has the lowest correlation with the mean and median models. 
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0.998 0.948 0.932 0.966 0.992 1.000
Common 
Pos. 1:1
1.000 0.956 0.939 0.963 0.997 0.997 1.000
Common 
Pos. 3:1
0.999 0.958 0.939 0.962 0.998 0.995 0.999 1.000
Source: Authors.
Table F1 already indicates that the two most controversial weighting decisions, which are relevant for the 
cooperation procedure (1987-1993) and co-decision I (1993-1999), have only a marginal impact on the 
overall results. When more power is granted neither to the president or the commissioner, nor to the 
Commission when compared to the Council of Ministers as they agree on the common position, this fun-
damentally alters our estimates (all correlations are > 0.99). Despite the considerable range of positions, 
which Appendix B and E have shown for the single decision when aggregating the final position – that is 
when many actors within the European Union have to find a compromise – one single position becomes 
less important. Against this background, both weighting decisions become marginal. However, we strongly 
favor the models, which are line with other (qualitative) studies.
All else being equal, Figure F2 plots the final position of the EU with these alternative weightings. Along 
with the bargaining model, the figure shows the final position where the president has more power than 
the commissioner within the Commission (‘Power within Com 99:1’), and vice versa (‘Power within Com 
1:99’). The final models illustrate the final position in which the Council has equal weight as it negotiates 
the Common Position, or to the contrary, in which the Commission has three times the power of the 
Council of Ministers.
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1985 1990 1995 2000
Bargaining model
Power within Com. 99:1 Power within Com 1:99
Common Pos. 1:1 Common Pos. 3:1
Source: Authors.
To sum up: Although some (weighting) decisions might seem controversial at first, their impact on the final 
estimate is marginal. In fact, if the mean model captures a consensus orientation, while the median model 
represents (stylized) majority voting rules, these results show that our bargaining model is able to capture 
both formal and informal decision rules in the European Union, and thus is the superior model when it 
comes to grasping empirical reality.
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